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Law and Development as Democratic
Practice
Thomas F. Mclnerney*
ABSTRACT

The importance of law and institutions to development is
now widely recognized. Significant amounts of development
assistance now target legal and institutional reform. These
efforts have generally viewed legal and institutional reform as
technical matters. Designing laws and institutions appropriate
to local circumstances has been seen as primarily requiring the
applicationof competent expertise. Yet practitionersin this field
may gain a different perspective. Reforms that on paper seem
wise may not get implemented, and those that are implemented
may not achieve their intended aims. In this Article, the Author
contends that one reason for this outcome is the failure of those
involved to account for the political dimension of the work. Once
it is recognized that legal and institutional reform in the
development context is just as political as in any other context,
the need to come to terms with the political dimension of the
work becomes clear. To reconcile the objectives of legal and
institutional reform for development with the need for some
degree of political legitimacy associated with the activity, a
political-theoretical account is needed. As a first attempt at
articulatingthat view, the Author relies on the ideals associated
with the discursive theory of law developed by Jurgen
Habermas. This view is in turn given more practicalgrounding
by reference to contemporary accounts of empowered
participatorygovernance, which seek to involve citizens directly
in defining state policy and practice. Three examples of what
this strongly participatory account of legal and institutional
reform might look like in practice follow.

* General Counsel, International Development Law Organization, Rome, Italy.
The author wishes to thank Aleksander Dardeli, Maria Sara Jijon, Yohannes
Kassahun, David Kennedy, Thomas F. McInerney, Jr., and Ewa Westman for helpful
comments on an earlier version of the Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Despite appreciable gains in the stature of law and development
during the past decade, new doubts about the field's viability have
surfaced. Recent scholarship seems united in the belief that the
promotion of the rule of law and good governance have, until now,
failed to deliver either improved rule of law or improved governance. 1

1.
See Cynthia Alkon, The Cookie Cutter Syndrome: Legal Reform Assistance
Under Post-Communist Democratization Programs, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 327, 328
(2002) ("Foreign assistance is making little impact in many of these nations because
these efforts fail to understand the fundamental reason or reasons that a particularly
society is not making lasting and meaningful legal reform."); Elliot Berg et al., Cote
d'ivoire, in AID AND REFORM IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM TEN CASE STUDIES 424
(Shantayanan Devarajan et al. eds., 2001) ("[I]nstitutional change in legal/judicial
systems is notoriously difficult ....
One only has to skim the literature to understand
that successful reforms in this area are few."); T.M. Thomas Isaac & Patrick Heller,
Democracy and Development: Decentralized Planning in Kerala, in DEEPENING
DEMOCRACY: INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 77, 82 (Archon
Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003) (noting that "successful and sustainable
democratic decentralization has been the exception to the rule"); Peter Evans, Beyond
"InstitutionalMonocropping": Institutions, Capabilities and Deliberative Development
9 (Jan. 27, 2002) (working paper) (on file with author) (referring to the failure of donor-
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The causes of these alleged failures are not yet well understood. 2
This Article contends that the problems that critics have identified
are principally the product of conceptual and methodological
weaknesses of efforts in this area. After identifying some of these
foundational problems, this Article attempts to re-conceptualize law
and development in terms of a broader process of democratic
development. In a departure from the prevailing instrumentalist
agenda, this Article contends that rule-of-law promotion activities
must respect the internal relation between law and democracy 3 in
order to bring about the conditions under which legitimate legal
orders can emerge.
The recent commitment of the international community to law
and development differs in kind from earlier experience. 4 Law is now
generally accepted as a critical development priority. Evidencing the
development community's consensus on the central importance of the
rule of law, donors have allocated substantial sums for its
improvement. Estimates are that approximately U.S.$3 billion has

imposed governance conditionality to generate positive results). See generally THOMAS
CAROTHERS, PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE
(Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Paper No. 34, Jan. 2003), available at
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp34.pdf (citing lack of knowledge or evidence
to prove the effectiveness of rule-of-law assistance); YVES DEZELAY & BRYANT GARTH,
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE
CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES 221 (2002); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, FORMER SOVIET UNION: U.S. RULE OF LAW ASSISTANCE HAS HAD LIMITED
IMPACT, GAO-01-354 (Apr. 2001); Bryant G. Garth, Building Strong and Independent
JudiciariesThrough the New Law and Development: Behind the Paradox of Consensus
Programs and Perpetually Disappointing Results, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 383 (2002);
Daniel Kaufman, Rethinking Governance: Empirical Lessons Challenge Orthodoxy
(Mar. 11, 2003), available at http://www.worldbank.org /wbi/governance/pdf/rethinkgov.stanford.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2003) (referencing the lack of improvement in
governance and the rule of law worldwide).
2.
What is clear is that the response of the law and development movement to
these emerging pressures will crucially determine its future. See David Trubek, The
"Rule of Law" in Development Assistance: Past, Present, and Future (2003), available at
http://cale.nomolog.nagoya-u.ac.jp/en/rocache/publications/research/Trubeck (proposing
work toward a reconstructed theory of the possibilities that law and development may
offer).
3.
See JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 133-51 (William Rehg trans., The MIT
Press 1996) (1992).

4.

See CAROTHERS, supra note 1; David Kennedy, Law and Developments, in

CONTEMPLATING COMPLEXITY: LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Amanda

Perry & John Hatchard eds., 2003); Trubek, supra note 2. These authors maintain
that the new law and development movement merits the name "rule of law" promotion.
However, the underlying concepts remain consistent. This Article will use the terms
law and development, legal reform, and rule-of-law promotion interchangeably to refer
to bilateral and multilateral donor-sponsored legal assistance to developing and
transition countries.
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been allocated to rule-of-law activities in the past decade. 5 It is
against this backdrop that challenges have emerged.
While the latest law and development movement has settled
upon the centrality of law in improving the well-being of citizens in
developing countries, the field is, according to one critic, incompletely
theorized. 6 In fact, there appears to be no theoretical apparatus at
work in most discussions of the subject. Generalized governance
truisms, combined with instrumentalist agendas, have spawned
orthodox technocratic prescriptions. This state of affairs stands in
stark contrast to legal thought in other contexts. Legal and political
theories play little, if any, role in informing the approach to law and
One significant consequence of the field's weak
development.
conceptual foundations is the rigid analytical distinction maintained
between concepts such as the rule of law and democracy.
An examination of law and development through the lens of
political and legal theory can generate new insights into the purposes
and processes legal reform should take. One crucial insight is the
interdependence of democracy and the rule of law. One normative
conclusion this Article draws from these premises is the need to
democratize governance and rule-of-law promotion activities. Honest
observers recognize that much legal and judicial reform implemented
to date has lacked the involvement of the public beyond the legal
community. 7 Despite the acknowledgement by some of the need for
more inclusive practices, 8 it is not clear that the lesson has been
absorbed in practice. Owing to the highly technical and specialized
nature of the field, rule-of-law and good governance promotion has

5.
6.

Trubek, supra note 2, at 2.
CAROTHERS, supra note 1, at 6.

See LINN HAMMERGREN, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., POLITICAL WILL,
7.
CONSTITUENCY BUILDING, AND PUBLIC SUPPORT IN RULE OF LAW PROGRAMS 4 (1998)

("most justice reforms have been negotiated and initiated without public involvement");
INT'L COUNCIL ON HUM. RTS. POL'Y, LOCAL PERSPECTIVES: FOREIGN AID TO THE JUSTICE

SECTOR 53 (2001), availableat www.ichrp.org (study noting that beneficiaries of legal
reform surveyed generally felt that their views, experiences, and needs were given too
little weight by donors); Berg et al., supra note 1, at 427 (noting that labor market
reforms in C6te d'Ivoire involved only the World Bank and government, excluding
trade unions); Trubek, supra note 2, at 12 (citing "faith that the needed reforms could
be imposed from the top" in the 1990s); Jennifer Widner, Reflections on Judicial
Reform 14, available at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/legalamjudref.doc
(last visited Oct. 25, 2003) ("developing country reform initiatives usually give no heed
to the problem of centralizing responsibility in a single person, usually the chief justice,
and his or her small staff'). Berg et al. offer a wide-ranging critique of legal-reform
programs in C6te d'Ivoire, but emphasize the non-inclusive nature of the process. They
note that with respect to general law and justice reforms, the Ministry of Justice action
plans were drawn up at the urging of Cooperacion Francaise and the World Bank, and
that their main elements reflected the agendas of these donors. Berg et al., supra note
1, at 427.
8.
Trubek, supra note 2, at 16.
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generally been insulated from the prevailing move toward
participatory development.
This Article seeks to rebut some underlying assumptions about
rule-of-law and governance assistance and offer conceptual grounds
on how to move forward. Part II of this Article describes problems
both at the level of expectations and in the overall approach to law
and development that may undermine its effectiveness. In Part III,
the Article develops a directly deliberative democratic account of how
law and development programs should be conceived and structured.
This account can be justified on normative, cognitive, and
instrumental grounds. In conclusion, the Article suggests in Part IV
that treating law and development as a democratic practice is more
consistent with the stated aims of the movement-fostering more
legitimate and democratic polities-and is thus a notion better suited
to supply convincing answers to the movement's critics. At the level
of practice, the Article contends that donor-financed rule-of-law
assistance strategies should prioritize the creation of institutions that
foster direct democratic participation in law reform.

II. CHALLENGING CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS
As law and development has become more mainstream, many of
its underlying assumptions have come to be taken for granted.
Strengthening the rule of law has gained widespread recognition,
What
even among the general public, as a development priority.
conventional accounts leave out, however, is any discussion of the
endeavor's complexity. Even those who recognize the complexity of
advancing the rule of law in difficult post-conflict states, for example,
conceive of the problem in roughly instrumental terms. 9 The rule of
law is seen as something tangible and definable; therefore, putting it
into practice is just a matter of finding the right technocratic package
and applying sufficient political muscle.
To plot a realistic approach to this field, four interrelated
problems must be addressed. Broadly conceived, these problems
arise from widespread misunderstanding of the dynamics and pace of
social and political change. Lacking this understanding, law and
development interventions frequently rest on flawed premises. The
persistence of these underlying assumptions fosters the view that
technocratic rather than democratic mechanisms can generate
democracy and the rule of law.
The first problem concerns the frequent adoption of hierarchical
and orthodox stances. Such approaches tax the cognitive abilities of

9.

See Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Law in Development: On Tapping, Gourding,

and Serving Palm-Wine, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 167, 222 (1997).
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those involved and fail to respect the multiplicity of institutional
arrangements capable of supporting the rule of law. A second
consideration involves the political nature of many legal-reform
initiatives, particularly those with implications for the distribution of
resources in society. The third issue concerns the naive concept of
human agency employed in law and development work. It is argued
here that a sufficiently rich conception of agency encompasses the
cognitive grounding of existing social, political, and legal
arrangements. The final consideration suggests a partial explanation
to the troubling question of why many law and governance reforms
have been ineffective. Examining the high-powered incentives for
law reform presented by international integration exposes the lack of
incentives presented to most developing countries for such efforts.
Together these problems speak to the need for collective and
In a world of
democratic solutions to rule-of-law promotion.
increasing complexity, traditional approaches to governance no longer
work. Strong central controls over political and economic actors can
no longer deliver the goods as in the days of triumphant
Keynesianism. In Western Europe, as in the United States, we have
moved from an interventionist to a regulatory model of the state.10
The function of the state in this model is to steer, not row. 1
Underlying this model is an understanding that it is cognitively
impossible for one group or a select group of actors to control the
workings of a single firm, let alone the entire economy. 2 To meet the
challenges posed by these forces, we must seek new forms of
democratic decision-making in both mature and developing legal
systems. Before embarking on that constructive venture, we must
first develop a more dynamic conception of the political, social, and
economic factors affecting rule-of-law promotion activities.
A. Orthodoxy and Hierarchy
By now, most observers of law and development agree that
i3
attempts at legal transplantation and orthodoxy frequently fail.

10.

Giandomenico Majone, From the Positive State to the Regulatory State:

Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance, 17 J. PUB. POL'Y 139

(1997).
11.
DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 25 (1992).

See Thomas F. McInerney, Implications of High Performance Production
12.
and Work Practices for Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance, 2004 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 135 (2004).
13.
See Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality and the
Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165 (2003) (citing measurements indicating
thirty-three percent lower legality in countries receiving law via transplantation).
That many recognize the failure of this approach does not mean that it no longer
affects the conduct of legal-reform programs. See W. Paatii Ofosu-Amaah, Legal and
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While substantial commentary regarding the tendency toward
orthodoxy in legal reform exists, relatively little commentary focuses
on the hierarchical approach that implementing orthodox solutions
requires. Fiat rather than discourse tends to facilitate wholesale
legal transplantation. Perhaps no better example of this practice
exists than in the transplantation of civil law throughout the
Americas during the colonial period. In modern times, the wholesale
adoption of foreign commercial codes without supporting regulatory
and institutional structures in the states of the former Soviet Union
had dire economic consequences in some cases. 14 Experience shows
that in legal reform, as in governance generally, unilateral solutions
fail. These solutions may work for a time but as a long-term
governance approach, consolidated, central direction of the political
and economic system is a losing proposition.
Unilateral solutions fail for a number of reasons, the primary
one being cognitive limitation. In societies of increasing complexity,
it is untenable to contend that one person or a select group of persons
can steer the social, economic, or political order. 15 Research in the
social sciences has contributed to our understanding of the limited
16
These critiques
ability of humans to make decisions individually.
Concepts
conclusions.
to
similar
us
but
bring
come from all directions
of bounded rationality and recognition of widespread irrationality in
decision-making have undermined the hyperbolic assumptions of
rationality in neo-classical economic thought. 17 Similarly, analyses of
informational asymmetries that arise in many contexts highlight the
difficulty of rendering decisions with incomplete information. The
understanding of the information processing function of markets

Judicial Reform in Developing Countries: Reflections on World Bank Experience, 8
NAFTA: LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 551 (2002). The author refers to a review undertaken
by the World Bank of the major law-reform exercises in Central and Eastern European
countries, which determined that wholesale legal transplantation efforts were "alive
and well." Id. at 576. Similarly, the author cites the practice in Latin American of
using judicial reform projects to promote Anglo-American oral advocacy models to
replace traditional inquisitorial approaches to the civil law systems. Id. at 577.
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatizationand Corporate Governance: The
14.
Lessons from Securities Market Failure,25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (1999) (citing Polish
and Czech privatization examples).
Oliver Gerstenberg & Charles Sabel, Directly Deliberative Polyarchy: An
15.
Institutional Ideal for Europe?, in

GOOD GOVERNANCE

IN EUROPE'S INTEGRATED

MARKET 289, 292 (Christian Joerges & Renaud Dehousse eds., 2002) ("[I]n a world of
radical indeterminacy, or because the costs of exploring the most promising potential
solutions would over-burden the most capable actor ... even the strongest favor some
division of investigative labour to incurring the risks of choosing and executing a
solution alone.").
16.

See generally JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

(1989) (using the social sciences to explain rationality at the individual and group
levels, and the constraints on each).
Id. at 31-41 (referring to indeterminacy and irrationality of decisions in
17.
opposition to rational choice theory).
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further demonstrates the relative inferiority of individual cognition in
As some observers have noted,
directing economic activity. 1 8
rationality constraints become particularly acute when making
institutional choices.1 9 Unintended consequences associated with
such choices, particularly when executed hierarchically, may be
considerable. 20 From a practical point of view, the failure of centrally
planned economies dramatically illustrates the cognitive limitations
any hierarchical or centralized governance system faces.
Just as government officials cannot hope to improve upon the
calculations of untold numbers of market participants, legal
reformers who attempt 'to impose solutions based on unilateral
assessments of what is best for a given society will surely err. It is
cognitively impossible for one person, a select group of elites, or
international donors to determine ex ante appropriate legal solutions
for a given country. 2 1 Complex socio-economic factors such as
competing norms, courses of dealing, vested interests, education,
religion, settled expectations, and path dependencies are only some of
the factors that must be taken into account in any reform project.
Forces such as these challenge the capacity of elite decision-makers
fed by foreign advisors to shoehorn solutions at odds with prevailing
social structures. Complexity and bounded rationality suggest the
need for collective rather than elite-driven reform.
Orthodoxy fails for similar reasons. If cognitive limitations make
it impossible for an external party to determine solutions ex ante,
then no orthodox solution-by definition determined in advancecould generally be expected to work. Although complexity no doubt
makes orthodoxy a convenient option, the failure of the preordained
blueprint to map reality ultimately cannot be ignored. The inability
22
of many legal transplants to "take" illustrates this phenomenon.
Likewise, the importance of strong institutions to economic growth
creates great temptation simply to install institutions modeled on
those of more economically successful countries, despite the fact that

18.
See F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519,
519-30 (1945).
19.
See JON ELSTER ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL
SOCIETIES: REBUILDING THE SHIP AT SEA 12-13 (1998).

DESIGN IN POST-COMMUNIST

20.
Id.
21.
See id. Elster et al. argue that the task of implementing wide-ranging
reforms is impossibly complex. No small cadre, let alone an individual, could obtain
the knowledge needed to anticipate consequences adequately. See also Jon Elster,

Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1987) (explaining how decisions in child custody cases are hampered by the inability to
obtain the knowledge needed to anticipate which parent would be in the best interest of
the child).
22.
See generally Kaufman, supra note 1 (examining the many challenges to
legal orthodoxy and why it has, in part, led to the failure of transplanted legal
systems).
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the social, political, and economic capital needed to sustain those
institutions do not exist.
These conceptual understandings make it all the more curious
that the tendency toward legal orthodoxy in law and development has
emerged at a time when great advances have been made in the
comparative political economy of countries of the Organisation for
Studies in
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 23
in
thinking
institutional
new
advanced
have
capitalism
comparative
24
of
centrality
the
acknowledging
While
way.
important
an
institutions, the varieties-of-capitalism approach examines how
economic, social, regulatory, and legal forces affect institutional
structures.2 5 It thus runs contrary to the prevailing view of the
26
inevitability of international convergence and homogenization.
Rather than inexorable convergence toward the model of AngloAmerican market economies, research suggests surprising durability
of local models and modes of accommodation characterized by local
27
flavor.
B. Money Is the Root of All... Politics
A further problem with conventional approaches to law and
development has been a lack of attention to distributive questionswhich is to say, politics. Because many of the participants in legal
reform are lawyers, the tendency to focus on exclusively legal

23.
See STEPHEN GOLUB, BEYOND RULE OF LAW ORTHODOXY: THE LEGAL
EMPOWERMENT ALTERNATIVE 4 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Paper
No. 41, Oct. 2003), available at http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/wp41.pdf (n.d.) (noting that
the devotion to legal orthodoxy is curious given its many problematic features).
24.
See generally VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001) [hereinafter
Hall & Soskicel. Similar research can be found in CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE
EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS (J. Rogers Hollingsworth & Robert Boyer eds., 1997).
Hall & Soskice, supra note 24.
25.
26.
In recent years, there has been a tremendous debate on whether
jurisdictions engage in regulatory competition, trying to improve upon the regulatory
systems of other states. Some argue that globalization is causing a "race to the top,"
with jurisdictions trying to devise rigorous regulatory systems, while others see just
the opposite, that is, a "race to the bottom." Katharina Pistor, The Standardizationof
Law and its Effect on Developing Economics, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 104 (2000). A third
stream, the convergence view, contends that international economic forces are driving
states to adopt substantially similar regulatory approaches. All states are thus seen as
converging on a single regulatory model, typically considered to be Anglo-American in
nature. See John W. Cioffi, State of the Art: A Review Essay on Comparative Corporate
Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 501, 504
(2000).
27.
See, e.g., A Long, Hard Climb: German and French Economic Reforms,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2003 (noting that France and Germany are not challenging the
social democratic basis of their societies in connection with reforms of the welfare
state).
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questions is great. 28 Legal reform is seen as a technical activity
primarily involving legal professionals, yet the best-laid plans for
legal change frequently collide with other forces.
Distributive questions are everywhere in this area. 29 Something
as seemingly innocuous as commercial law reform can affect the
channeling of existing economic activity into the official economy,
which may hurt the business prospects of someone previously
operating in the unofficial economy.
For instance, curtailing
corruption naturally affects the income of public officials,30 and
changing an investment code may reduce or increase the power of
unions or employees. A related point deals with systemic changes.
Improvements in the quality of services in one area can impede the
provision of services elsewhere. Thomas Carothers uses the example
of the courts being overwhelmed as a consequence of administrative
improvements. 3 1 Any of these changes may be advisable, yet they
challenge the ability of law to mediate the pressures that arise. It is
interesting that some economists fail to deal with the incentive
problems of those hurt by the distributional consequences of legal
reform but also rattle against the rent-seeking behavior of individuals
who benefit from an existing order. 32 While legal reform may equip
lawyers and judges with cutting-edge legal knowledge or "best
practices," countervailing forces that cannot be mediated through the
legal system may frustrate efforts to see legal reform put into
practice. Distributive questions may arise in any legal-reform project
but are, if anything, more acute in developing countries in which
incomes and social safety nets are modest.
Distributive questions are inherently political.
In the legal
context, as elsewhere, it is impossible to solve distributive questions
based solely on technical criteria. 33 Weighing distributive choices
requires judgment, 34 and exercising judgment with respect to the
distribution of resources under conditions of scarcity is a political

28.

CAROTHERS, supra note 1, at 8.

29.
I owe these observations to David Kennedy.
Peter Evans, supra note 1, at 6.

Kennedy, supra note 4; see

30.
See, e.g., HARRY BLAIR & GARY HANSEN, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV.,
WEIGHING IN ON THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: STRATEGIC APPROACHES FOR DONOR-

SUPPORTED RULE OF LAW PROGRAMS 7 (1994) ("Resistance to structural change in the
courts is particularly unyielding where rent-seeking opportunities [of judges and court
staff] are endangered."); see also SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION IN
GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND REFORMS 27-38 (1999).

31.
CAROTHERS, supra note 1, at 10.
32.
See Isaac & Heller, supra note 1, at 82 (noting that mainstream
development thinking perceives the world as "largely frictionless and apolitical").
33.
Amartya Sen, What is the Role of Legal and Judicial Reform in the
Development
Process? 5,
available at
http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/
legopjudicial/ljr-confpapers/Sen.pdf(last visited Nov. 1, 2004); see also Evans supra
note 1; Kennedy, supra note 4, at 3.
34.
Sen, supra note 33, at 3.
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affair. While glazed over in mainstream discussions of law and
development, practitioners are well aware, sometimes painfully so,
that unresolved political battles sometimes make their technical
assistance interventions futile. 35 In such contexts, the desire to
remain a neutral technician dispensing apolitical best-practice advice
may require especially strong blinders. Because distributive choices
frequently intersect with legal choices, a theory of law and
development that does not rest on a prior theory of collective decisionmaking (i.e., democracy) will leave such paradoxes unresolved and
ultimately result in failed assistance.
The very choice of a society to adopt a market economy requires
not only political but also ideological backing. Amy Chau has noted
that in OECD countries, such support has arisen as a consequence of
belief in the possibility of upward mobility, the value of self-reliance,
the importance of workers exercising control over the workplace, and
the necessity of employer commitment to worker well-being. 36 She
contends that aspects of these beliefs have contributed to the
durability of market economies in most OECD countries. 37 No matter
how well-intentioned development policies might be, at least a
median segment of the population must support market reforms for
the intended purpose to be achieved. Given the dramatic disparity in
wealth existing in many developing countries, achieving political
support will require legal reforms that entail distributive
consequences acceptable to a critical mass of the population.
Historical experience suggests that while reform may be pursued
for intrinsic reasons, the alignment of reform movements with
political movements involving broader distributive concerns can fuel
the fire.
In the United States, during the period of the late
nineteenth century through the early twentieth century, growing
dissatisfaction with corruption and inefficiency in the judiciary fed
the reformist cause. 38 For years this movement was driven primarily
by elites who sought to develop greater propriety in the legal
profession and the courts generally. 39 Yet it was case of Lochner v.
New York, 40 in 1905, and the rise of substantive due process
jurisprudence by the conservative Hughes Court that broadened and
accelerated calls for judicial reform. 41 Notably, the then-powerful
labor movement added judicial reform to its agenda, and populist

35.
See Heather Marquette, The Creeping of Politicisationof the World Bank:
The Cage of Corruption,52 POL. STUD. 413, 420 (2004).
36.
Amy Chau, The Paradox of Free Market Democracy: Rethinking
Deuelopment Policy, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 287, 301-07 (2000).

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 306.
Widner, supra note 7, at 8.
Id. at 8-9.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Widner, supra note 7, at 8.
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politicians, like President Theodore Roosevelt, capitalized on this
sentiment and proposed radical reforms. 42 Likewise, the existence of
economic and social issues for which citizens sought judicial redress
made judicial reform a matter of democratic concern. 43 This history
suggests that the challenge of gaining popular support for legal and
judicial reform hinges in part on the ability to align legal and judicial
reform movements with broader political concerns that hold wider
distributive consequences.
By arguing that distributive questions must be resolved by
political agreement before legal reform can be achieved, a greater role
for rule-of-law promotion is not suggested. Instead, the argument
here is that in order for effective law reform to occur, mechanisms for
mediating conflicting political claims that arise in the process must
exist. Put differently, those who would tax law with the burden of
solving distributive questions prioritize the right over the good. In
44
reality, the two are determined dialectically and interpenetrate.
Leaving distributive questions, whether involving resources or power,
to law and development programs lacking the ability to mediate
competing claims democratically is a surefire recipe for failure.
C. Rethinking Agency
Further challenging law and development is the unrealistic
model of agency employed by most practitioners. Those on the
receiving end of legal assistance are too often conceived as passive
recipients of best-practice wisdom from abroad. Since the recipients
of legal assistance are implicitly perceived as hailing from
dysfunctional legal systems, they are expected to adopt and
implement willingly all changes necessary to steer their systems in
the proper direction.
In reality, legal professionals may not willingly accept even welladvised changes. As noted in the description of distributive effects
above, lawyers receiving rule-of-law assistance from abroad are also
the products of unique legal traditions and social positions.
Regardless of the jurisdiction; legal training usually entails a great
degree of socialization, and this understanding differs from the
methodological individualist assumptions of many proponents of legal
reform. As a result of the hegemony of economics-particularly neo-

42.
Id.
43.
Id. at 13.
44.
See Thomas McCarthy, Legitimacy and Diversity: DialecticalReflections on
Analytical Distinctions, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1083, 1103-05 (1996) (arguing that legalp litical norms and moral norms are dialectically interdependent); see also Jfirgen
Habermas, Reply to Symposium Participants,Benjamin Cardozo School of Law, 17
CARDOZo L. REV. 1477, 1487-88 (1996) (responding to McCarthy).

20051

LA WAND DEVELOPMENT

classical-in legal-reform thinking, calls for an adequate sociological
understanding have been drowned out.
Pierre Bourdieu's sociology illustrates the inadequacies of
existing conceptions of agency in law and development. 45 In contrast
to traditional structuralist thought, which concentrated principally on
objective social structures, Bourdieu offers both an objective and
agent-centered sociology. 46 With respect to the former, he examines
the existence of objective social structures in what he calls various
"fields" of social practice. 47 With respect to the latter, rather than
treat such structures as having some independent ontological status,
he points to their cognitive roots. 48 In other words, external social
structures exist and are replicated at the level of the individual. This
cognitive basis, what Bourdieu calls the habitus, consists of historical
relations that are implanted in individual bodies to form mental and
physical schemata of perception, appreciation, and action. 4 9 These
cognitive structures, rather than invariant over time, are "historically
constituted, institutionally grounded, and thus socially variable,
It is important to understand both the
generative matri[ces]. 5 0
concepts of habitus and field dynamically. Agents, predisposed to a
particular habitus, undertake strategic action (or "play" in
Bourdieuian terms) within a particular field. 5 1 Actions that agents
take within a particular field are not predetermined but rather are
shaped by the habitus to which they are disposed.
Bourdieu's analysis of the extent to which individuals take on
cognitive dispositions based on social structures in which they
interact conveys the extent to which strategic choices by individuals
are to a certain degree conditioned. Applying thinking similar to
Bourdieu, Thomas Carothers contends that law is a "normative
system that resides in the minds of the citizens of a society."52 His

For purposes of this paper, I rely on Bourdieu to offer a critique of existing
45.
conceptions of law and development. I do not purport to supplant empirically grounded
examinations of the law and development field. Impressive empirically grounded work
on the topic, which employs Bourdieuian methodology, has recently emerged. See YVES
DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS:
LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES

(2002) (examining the process of globalization in Latin America); Yves Dezalay &
Bryant G. Garth, Legitimizing the New Legal Orthodoxy, in GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS:
THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL ORTHODOXY 306,

307-12 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002) (describing Bourdievian
methodology as requiring examination of the "genesis" of rules and institutions).
Loic J.D. Wacquant, Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic
46.
of Bourdieu's Sociology, in AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 14 (1992).
Id.
47.
Id.
48.

49.
50.
51.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19.

52.

CAROTHERS, supra note 1, at 8.

122

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 38:109

analysis points to the cognitive basis of the new institutionalist
examination of path dependency.5 3 History may not be destiny, 54 but
it does exert considerable inertial effect on individual actors.
Attempts to promote legal reform as a development project must
reflect the strong influence of existing structures.
A related point stems from the strong tacit dimension of much
legal knowledge. It is a notion not captured by the distinction
between procedural and substantive law.
Both procedural and
substantive law can be codified in the form of rules contained in
books. Knowledge of the law on the books is explicit. Someone can
ask a question about what the law is by pointing to a page of text, but
no lawyer who has practiced for any period of time would say that
merely knowing the laws on the books suffices to make one a lawyer.
Lawyers exiting law school and passing entrance examinations to the
bar may have obtained a large amount of explicit knowledge, but they
generally know how to do very little. What they lack, and what
experienced lawyers have, is tacit knowledge. As Michael Polyani
noted in connection with the transplantation of a light-bulb machine
from overseas to his native Hungary, the machine failed to operate
notwithstanding the fact that the same machine was in operation in
neighboring Austria. 55 His explanation of what was lacking, tacit
knowledge, helps illustrate an important aspect of what it means to
be a lawyer. Included in this notion are techniques for writing,
research, speaking, advising clients, and-more important-making
judgments on the meaning of statutes, the willingness of a given
judge to accept one argument over another, and how to draft a
contract that will stand up in court.
As described in connection with the limitations on knowledge
above, the tacit dimension of the law imposes significant hurdles on
those seeking to transform a legal system. Lawyers in any system
can, and must, relearn certain practices to keep pace with changes
that occur over time. Fundamental change poses greater difficulties,
because the wider the legal reform, the more tacit knowledge that is
lost. Since tacit knowledge is often what distinguishes a good lawyer
from a mediocre one, making existing tacit knowledge irrelevant

53.
See, e.g., DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990) (developing a theory of institutional change and its
role in economic development).
54.
55.

ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, POLITICS: THE CENTRAL TEXTS (1997).
MICHAEL POLYANI, TACIT DIMENSION (1966); see also Richard Langlois &

Nicholai Foss, Capabilitiesand Governance: The Rebirth of Production in the Theory of
Economic Organization (DRUID,
Working
Paper,
1997),
available at
http://ideas.repec.org/plaallabbswp/97-2.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2004) (surveying
"capabilities" view that complements incentive-based views of economic organization).
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carries certain hazards. 56 Here too, distributive consequences play a
role. Only infinite faith in the altruistic tendencies of lawyers could
support the view that change that threatens their livelihoods will be
willingly accepted solely because it will improve the general welfare.
D. State-Level Incentives
The limited progress of legal reform in many transitioning and
developing economies contrasts sharply with the recent experience of
some states proceeding toward economic integration. The power of
incentives in motivating states to undertake broad legal reforms
holds significant explanatory potential in this regard. Some of the
most dramatic examples of widespread legal reform in the past fifteen
years can be attributed to the power of international integration,
notably in connection with EU and WTO accession. The high-power,
state-level incentives that opportunities for economic integration offer
have driven countries like the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and
57
other EU accession states to undertake significant reforms.
Likewise, China's efforts to comply with WTO guidelines before
joining that organization speak to the tremendous motivation the
prospect of WTO membership engendered. 58 Certainly more work
remains in many of these countries.
All too often we read these
reforms as merely the process of conforming to the guidelines of the
international regime in question, yet what this interpretation fails to
take into account is the convergence of political forces within a
country that is necessary to enable such reforms to take foot. Despite
significant opposition in some cases, political forces in these states
have consolidated around reform priorities and delivered on a
substantial scale.
Indeed, the experience of international integration makes a key
argument for state interest in legal reform appear impotent. Vague
promises of potential gains in foreign direct investment from legal
reform are too intangible to generate the massive mobilization of
political and social forces needed to realize far-reaching reform. One
need only survey statistics on foreign direct investment concentrated
in only a handful of countries to wonder whether those states looking

56.
Widner, supra note 7, at 6 ("[O]ne of the reasons for the slow response [to
judicial reform in the United States] was that some lawyers profited from the archaic
procedures others wanted to abolish.").
57.
See, e.g., Sunny Prospects, ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 2004, at 46 (quoting
Poland's Prime Minister Marek Belka as saying they had "grossly underestimated the
positive effects of accession"). This lesson certainly will not be lost on potential new
accession states and suggests that weighing potential economic gains from economic
integration is a significant consideration for policymakers.
58.
See generally Out of Puff: A Survey of China: Money Worries, ECONOMIST,
June 15, 2002, at 8-9 (discussing changes to China's financial institutions related to its
entry into the WTO).
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in from the outside will really be incentivized in the way the law and
development movement generally hopes.
While the economic
literature seems fairly settled on a positive correlation between welldeveloped legal systems and development (with causation appearing
plausible but unproven),59 the gains states can expect to experience
from general improvements in the rule of law are long-term.
Compared with the relatively short-term incentives political and
economic integration poses, such long-term promises may be of
limited force in mobilizing significant political and social power
behind legal reform.
Incentives that are more tangible and
compelling are necessary. The deliberative approach to law and
development described below can explain how equally powerful
incentives for legal reform can arise under the right institutional
conditions.

III. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRATIC MODEL OF LEGAL REFORM
Once we depart from orthodoxy and hierarchy, we open ourselves
to a range of possibilities. As the varieties-of-capitalism approach
suggests, institutional starting points will dictate widely different
reform options.6 0 Only a deliberative democratic approach is capable
of responding to these factors. While many in the development
community express their support for a participatory approach to
development, the justification is usually instrumental. 61 This Article
contends that the rationale for inclusive law and development goes
beyond mere instrumental reasons.
Instead, inclusive and
deliberative legal reform is a sine qua non for the creation of
legitimate law and democracy. Rather than simply one of the various
options available, the application of a truly deliberative participatory
legal-reform process is essential to upholding the very purpose of
reform.
Through contemporary legal and democratic theory we can
obtain greater clarity on the preconditions of legal reform, which bear
on the question of legitimacy. Any program of law and development
must have the creation and maintenance of a legitimate legal order as
both its starting point and ultimate goal. An illegitimate legal order
may in some instances generate economic development, but at a
minimum, law and development interventions must posit
transformation to a legitimate order as a favored result.
Habermas' discourse theoretic account of law and democracy
provides a basis for considering the preconditions of any law and

59.
60.
61.

Kaufman, supra note 1, at 17.
See Berkowitz et al., supra note 13.
Id.
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development program. 62 With appropriate adjustments, this account
of how legitimate law is formed provides a metric against which legalHabermas' call for deliberative
reform work may be judged.
and
instrumental questions facing
both
normative
democracy resolves
the law and development movement.
The root of Habermas' legal theory is his intersubjective theory
of truth and morality. 63 Writing in response to postmodern critics of
traditional rationalism, he contends that truth is determined by
virtue of intersubjective discourse.6 4 He extends this argument to
develop his moral theory of discourse ethics, according to which
morality is determined by virtue of the achievement of a hypothetical
unanimous agreement by all concerned persons who engage in a
process of moral argumentation and debate. 65 Translated to the legal
context, this theory is used to develop an account of legitimate law
creation. Discourse is essential to the creation of legitimate law.
Habermas writes that "under post-metaphysical conditions, the only
legitimate law is one that emerges from the discursive opinion- and
''
will-formation of equally enfranchised citizens. 66
Habermas' discursive model of law and democracy is procedural
rather than substantive. 67 He does not posit some transcendent value
as the basis for law's legitimacy. 68 Instead, he views democratic
procedures as the basis upon which a legitimate legal order can
arise. 69 As one commentator has stated, in a post-Enlightenment
world "legitimacy stems from these procedures and not from the
assertions of those who claim, for instance, the divine right of
kings." 70 It is a view that simultaneously avoids the inadequacy of
strongly positivist accounts of the rule of law as mere legality 71 while
steering clear of expansive substantive criteria for legitimacy, such as
72
natural law.

62.
HABERMAS, supra note 3, at 448.
Id. at 28-41.
63.
64.
Id. at 34-35.
65.
This is a translation of the Kantian principle of never acting in a way that
one cannot also will the maxim of the action to become a universal law. See JOHN
RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 251-57 (1971) (describing the Rawlsian original position
as a combination, in part, of Rantian autonomy and Kant's concept of the categorical
imperative).
66.

HABERMAS, supra note 3, at 408.

Id. at 408-09.
67.
68.
But see Richard J. Bernstein, The Retrieval of the Democratic Ethos, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 1127, 1130-37 (1996) (arguing that some shared substantive ethical
pre-commitment is required before discursive democratic practices can be initiated).
69.
HABERMAS, supra note 3, at 453 (noting that the discourse-theoretic
approach steers between the two pitfalls of positivism and natural law).
Mitchell Aboulafia, Law Professors Read Habermas, 76 DENV. U. L. REV.
70.
943, 950 (1999).
71.

HANS KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal.

Press 1960) (1934).
72.

JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
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Civil society resides at the core of this proceduralist legal theory.
Habermas conceives the informal sphere of civil society as the locus of
free-wheeling political debate and exchange. 73 This informal public
sphere involves voluntary associations, media, and religious
organizations, among others, which perform the task of feeding the
public institutions with democratic input. Formal legal institutions
render decisions and produce laws, but they also perform the
essential function of taking up input from the public sphere and
translating it into binding law. According to this model, legal
legitimacy is determined in terms of a "decentered, civil society-based
theory that focuses on the forms of communications between the
unrestricted, but weak, societal sphere and the necessarily restricted,
but relatively strong, public political spheres. '' 74
In a sense,
"procedural law becomes, above all law of ... civil society. '75 In the
discursive model of democracy, civil society acts as the conduit for
transmitting the input of the public to state institutions.
Because of the centrality of civil society in contributing to the
law-making process, deepening the rule of law from a Habermasian
perspective requires strengthening the cultural sphere of the public
space. 76 A fundamental failing of existing legal orders in many
liberal democratic states is not at the level of existing law's content,
but rather a result of the inadequate procedures of public
communication that inform the justification and adoption of legal
norms. 77 Law, in this theory, is at the heart of democracy; each
presupposes the other.
[T]he discourse theory of law conceives constitutional democracy as
institutionalizing-by way of legitimate law (and hence by also
guaranteeing private autonomy)-the procedures and communicative
presuppositions for a discursive opinion- and will-formation that in
turn makes it possible (the exercise of political autonomy and)
78
legitimate lawmaking.

The procedures that law establishes thus make law-making informed
by civil society possible.
The codetermination of law and democracy explains why mere
grants of formal legal rights or the adoption of formal legal constructs
cannot result in legitimate law. For the substance of the rights
necessary for a democracy requires democratic input before their

73.
William E. Scheuerman, Between Radicalism and Resignation: Democratic
Theory in Habermas's Between Facts and Norms, in HABERMAS: A CRITICAL READER
156, 156-58 (Peter Dews ed., 1999).
74.
Andrew Arato, Reflexive Law, Civil Society, and Negative Rights, 17
CARDoZo L. REV. 785, 787 (1996).
75.
Id. at 787 (emphasis added).
76.
Jacques Lenoble, Law and Undecidability: A New Vision of the
Proceduralizationof Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 935, 947 (1996).
77.
Id. at 948.
78.

HABERMAS, supra note 3, at 437.
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conferral.7 9 The democratic process itself is necessary to determine
the content of rights. Put differently, we cannot even conceive of
political ends without first having gone through a process of political
deliberation."0 Likewise, in Habermas' inter-subjective theory of
truth, determining how to implement substantive legal commitments
In concrete terms, Habermas faced this
must occur discursively.
issue in connection with the unification of Germany.8 1 At that time,
he argued that the inclusion of the German Democratic Republic in
West Germany should have occurred pursuant to a process of largeOnly such a debate would have both
scale public debate.8 2
regenerated the autonomous public spheres lacking in the previously
totalitarian state and established the requisite normative parameters
for the process. 8 3 For Habermas, discursive processes are a sine qua
non for the creation of a democratic order.
In societies of increasing complexity, creating the conditions
under which discourse can occur is difficult. Law itself plays a
critical role. Relying on systems theory, Habermas argues that in
functionally differentiated societies, law acts as a mediator between
autonomous subsystems. Because each subsystem has a unique
expert language, referred to in systems theoretic language as a
"code," understandable only to participants in that subsystem, some
connecting language is needed to integrate the disparate subsystems
into a single society. That language is ordinary language. Habermas
argues that non-specialized ordinary language roots specific action
systems in society (the "lifeworld").8 4 Institutions capable of steering
specialized subsystems through ordinary language anchor those
subsystems in the broader social world.8 5 The language of law, in
turn, transmits ordinary communication from the public and private

79.

Id. at 449-50.

The democratic process bears the entire burden of legitimation. It must
simultaneously secure the private and public autonomy of legal subjects. This
is because individual private rights cannot even be formulated, let alone
politically implemented, if those affected have not first engaged in public
discussions to clarify which features are relevant in treating typical cases as
alike or different, and then mobilized communicative power for the
consideration of their newly interpreted needs.
Id. at 450 ("[I]ndividual private rights cannot even be adequately
80.
formulated, let alone politically implemented, if those affected have not first engaged in
public discussions to clarify which features are relevant in treating typical cases as
alike or different, and then mobilized communicative power for the consideration of
their newly interpreted needs.").
Pierre Guibentif, Communicative Action and Production of Law, in
81.
HABERMAS, MODERNITY AND LAW 59 (Mathieu Deflem ed., 1996).
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.

HABERMAS, supra note 3, at 353-54.

85.

Id. at 354.
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spheres and acts as a "transformer," enabling communication
between autonomous subsystems. To the extent that legal language
penetrates functional subsystems, it distributes ordinary language
throughout society.
Habermas sees law as a source of social integration. Law serves
as a mediator between functional subsystems, the state, and civil
society rather than as the driver of social and political change. The
function of law is to translate the inputs of civil society
(communicative power) into a form accessible to the state apparatus
(administrative power).8 6 In an attempt to democratize existing
institutions, Habermas wishes to prioritize the ordinary language of
the public in deliberations on public matters. The challenge for an
expert language like law is to make it sufficiently accessible to the
public so that a broader discourse that deals with the political, social,
and economic effects of legal reform can occur. Law as the medium of
discourse, however, does not mean that we can technocratically
burden law exclusively with the task of political and economic reform.
There are multiple ways to interpret this call to institutionalize
discursive procedures for gathering the "wild" inputs of civil society to
feed formal state decision-making.8 7 One could interpret it as a call
for simply grafting institutions or mechanisms onto existing state
structures. Such an approach would, in Habermas' words, "substitute
facticity for validity. 8 8 In other words, it would be to assume the
ineluctable quality of existing state structures. Yet Habermas' longstanding commitment to revitalized democracy calls for a more
adventurous reading. Rather than accept all institutions as given, we
must conceive of new institutions capable of performing the necessary
function of giving voice to citizens. One cannot reasonably consider
the institutional legacies of colonial or authoritarian regimes as
necessarily capable of responding to the problem-solving needs of
developing economies today.8 9
Imaginative approaches to
institutional design, informed by deliberation among all affected
participants, may give rise to institutions better aligned with history,
culture, and development priorities.

86.
87.

Scheuerman, supra note 73, at 158.
Kenneth Baynes, Democracy and the Rechtstadt: Habermas' Factizitat und
Geltung, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HABERMAS 218 (Stephen White ed., 1995).
88.
That is, a statement of what is for what should be.
89.
Introduction to DEMOCRACY UNREALIZED: DOCUMENTA 11_PLATFORM 1
(Enwezor et al. eds., 2002). But see Charles F. Sabel & Rory O'Donnell, Democratic
Experimentalism: What to Do About Wicked Problems After Whitehall (And What
Scotland May Just Already Be Doing), Presented to the OECD Conference on
Devolution and Globalization (Feb. 28, 2000), available at http://www2.law.
columbia.edulsabel/papers/glasPO.html.
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A. From Civil Society Alongside the State to Empowered
ParticipatoryGovernance
Recent studies on institutions that make broad participation an
operating principle are consistent with the spirit of Habermasian
discursive democracy but deepen its democratic impulse in important
ways. 90
Notions such as empowered participatory governance, 9 1
directly deliberative polyarchy, 92 and associational democracy 93 have
been developed to explain the innovative institutional structures of
these new approaches to democratic governance. In contrast to
Habermas' strict division between private and public spheres, this
school posits the creation of hybrid institutions that mediate public
and private institutions in novel ways. 9 4 Democratic decisionmaking, viewed in this manner, is not something that happens
exclusively in the confines of state institutions fed by civil society
inputs-a more or less pluralistic model-but instead occurs through
the engagement of citizens in direct decision-making under the
auspices of the state.
Although a relatively new subject of research, initial empirical
analysis suggests that the empowered participatory governance
model can potentially solve intractable social problems through
unorthodox means. 95 Drawing from a range of examples, Archon
Fung and Erik Olin Wright identify the key elements that
characterize this model. These elements include "(1) focus on specific,
tangible problems, (2) involvement of ordinary people affected by
these problems and officials close to them, and (3) the deliberative
The variety of
development of solutions to these problems. ' 96
examples to which this model has been applied and the open-ended
and diverse manner in which institutions satisfying these criteria can
be configured makes it clear that something different from a new
orthodoxy is at work.
The practical orientation of these deliberative processes ensures
that the focus remains on problem-solving rather than ideological or
partisan concerns.
Persons of diverse backgrounds can reach

90.
See Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-DeliberativePolyarchy, 3 EUR.
L.J. 313 (1997).
91.
See generally Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Thinking About
Empowered Participatory Governance, in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INNOVATIONS IN
EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 3 (2003).

92.
Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 EUR.L.J.
313, 313 (1997).
93.
Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, Secondary Associations and Democratic

Governance, 20 POL. & Soc'Y 393 (1992).
94.
95.
96.

See, e.g., id.; Cohen & Sabel, supra note 92; Fung & Wright, supra note 91.
See generally Fung & Wright, supranote 91.
Id. at 15.
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agreement on problems ranging from community policing to economic
development without becoming burdened by political concerns that
The grassroots
often undermine cooperative political relations.
nature of the approach strips experts of their privileges and brings
into play the substantial local knowledge that ordinary people hold.
The benefits of such an approach are better-informed policies and
improved accountability over political principals. Experts are not
irrelevant to the process, but they play a supportive rather than
dominant role. 97 Fung and Wright contend that experts serve to
"facilitate popular deliberative decision-making and to leverage
synergies between professional and citizen insights rather than preempt popular input. ' 98 Finally, the process of deliberation involves
participants reciprocally listening to each others' positions and
generating group choices after due consideration.9 9 The process of
deliberative decision-making, resulting in consensus, not unanimity,
avoids the deficiencies of winner-takes-all voting.
of institutions that facilitate empowered
The design
participatory governance involves three considerations: devolution,
centralized supervision and coordination, and a state-centered
focus.' 00 Devolution is essential to opening up existing political
arrangements to democratic participation. 10 1 In contrast to
Habermas, who hopes to drive the democratic inputs of civil society
into the formal state apparatus, the empowered participatory
governance approach devolves power from the state to new
Simultaneous with the process of2
deliberative institutions.
0
devolution, these new institutions come under central supervision.'
Some coordinating mechanism is required to provide accountability
and ensure that innovations that develop locally are shared
horizontally. The combination of devolution with enhanced central
monitoring constitutes a different governance model than the move to
"autonomous decentralization," or wholesale relinquishment of
control over devolved institutions occurring in many countries
today.' 0 3 In addition, while this governance model empowers citizen
actors, it is not a mere voluntaristic endeavor.' 0 4 Unlike specialized
issue groups seeking to fight state power, the citizens' groups
engaging in empowered participatory governance take a direct role in

Id. at 17.
97.
Id.
98.
99.
Id. This characterization of deliberation is similar to Habermas' notion of
See JURGEN HABERMAS, MORAL
the "unforced force of the better argument."
CONSCIOUNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 160 (CHRISTIAN LENHARDT & SHIERRY

WEBER NICHOLSEN trans., MIT Press 1990).
Fung & Wright, supra note 91, at 20.
100.
101.

Id.

102.
103.
104.

Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 22-23.
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governance. 10 5 In contrast to conventional issue-oriented activism
that, consistent with the Habermasian model, seeks to influence the
state from outside, citizens are, in effect, brought inside the state to
they contribute to the formulation of policy alongside
the extent that
10 6
actors.
state
This model of empowered participatory governance holds great
potential for the development, analysis, and application of knowledge.
Empowered participatory governance can overcome limitations on
Through discursive processes,
cognition described earlier.
information sharing occurs in a much more vital manner. Therefore,
the direct deliberative model offers a convincing response to theorists
favoring knowledge-based development assistance.' 0 7 Contrary to
David Ellerman's argument, truly open and participatory institutions
should be capable of taking advantage of the technical knowledge of
08
foreign experts without succumbing to domination by technocrats.'
As the examples in Section IV below show, directly deliberative
processes can substantially enrich the knowledge base on which
development occurs.
B. Applying the Direct DeliberativeModel in Developing Countries
Before making some observations on what direct discursive
democracy means for law and development, some preliminaries must
be considered. For simplicity's sake, this Article assumes that there
are two categories of states receiving law and democracy assistance.
On one side are states with the main institutions of government fully
established and functioning to some degree, and on the other are the
states with poorly developed administrations and civil society.
Included in this second category are states emerging from conflict,
whether a civil war or revolution, as well as former autocracies. This
latter type of state may have very little civil society from which to
draw in conducting discursive legal-reform programs.10 9
From this standpoint, the manner in which Habermas' argument
is applied will differ depending upon the relevant category into which
a state falls. In the former case of a functioning legal order,
empowered deliberative governance will work as an outgrowth of
existing institutions. Where organized civil society is weak, efforts
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105.
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David Ellerman, Knowledge-Based Development Institutions (Nov. 1998),
107.
available at http://www4.worldbank.org/afr/stats/pdf/8cabusi.pdf (last visited Mar. 9,
2004).
Id. at 218.
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See generally JURGEN HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
109.
(Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984). This is the situation Habermas referred to in
connection with the organization of autonomous civil society actors in the DDR to
deliberate on the unification of Germany.
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must be made to improve its capacity to participate in the discourse
surrounding law reform. For those societies lacking a rich civic life,
greater efforts need to be made. In the latter case, creation of new
From a
structures, rather than devolution, will be required.
Habermasian perspective, when working in countries that lack
developed constitutional orders through which discourse can be
channeled in creating legitimate law, international institutions
advancing legal or institutional reform must try to replicate the
conditions adhering under well-developed constitutional orders. In
those cases, what is required is the creation of some functionally
equivalent parallel structure, perhaps on an ad hoc basis, to bring
public opinion into the process of legal reform. Nevertheless, these
situations suggest that the legal-reform programs cannot be expected
to rely on the capabilities of a broad range of society in states
This
recovering from intense social and political dislocation.
observation is not meant to discount the democratic imperative in any
way.
C. From Lack of Will to Will-Formation
In explaining the shortcomings in law and development, those
involved frequently speak of the lack of political will to implement
reforms. Indeed, it appears that in many cases countries have only
come to reform as a result of donor or other external pressure. 110
Political will does not form without generative influence of the public.
Conceiving law reform as a discursive process requiring the
involvement of all affected persons is a more appealing and realistic
vision than conventional accounts of those law reformers that cite the
need for "buy in," "local ownership," or "tailoring solutions to local
conditions." It is not that these notions are wholly erroneous; rather,
when compared with a dynamic deliberative democratic model, they
appear weak. A proceduralist understanding of the law-reform
process that is properly implemented will, by its nature, ensure that
solutions do not do violence to local conditions. As illustrated in the
work of Bourdieu, time is required for that discourse to generate
change and for changes to be internalized by agents. 111
The role of technical assistance and training for the legal
profession is essential to this process. Instead of hoisting "best
practices" onto existing legal systems, lawyers should be given the
tools with which to advise participatory reform groups and, in the

110.
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case of law, steer reform in a way that builds on existing functional
institutions and advances alternatives where appropriate. Indeed,
the experience of a number of the empowered participatory
governance experiments is that training of ordinary citizens is often
required to allow them to participate more fully.1 12 Rather than
treating technical complexity as a barrier to exclude citizens, the
empowered democratic model attempts to overcome such barriers
through capacity building.
Berkowitz et al. are persuasive in showing that the receptiveness
of a country to a given legal transplant affects the transplant's
success. 113 Demand in a country for legal change will intuitively be
more likely to generate a fit with existing systems. The details of the
domestic receptivity to the transplant need to be considered. The
argument becomes more convincing if receptivity has procedural
connotation. Following Berkowitz et al., this Article suggests that
receptivity to legal transplants must germinate organically, through
directly deliberative processes. Wholesale transplantation that does
not involve such processes is likely to run afoul of all four problems
discussed in Part II.
D. After Elites and Technocrats, Citizens
As Habermas has argued in connection with the role of civil
114
society in conferring democratic legitimacy on expert subsystems,
the participation of constituencies outside of the legal profession is
necessary for legal-reform initiatives to gain legitimacy. Research on
empowered participatory governance buttresses this claim. 115 This
broadened discourse of interested participants is particularly
important when issues having distributive consequences are involved.
Since, as is argued here, most legal-reform issues entail distributive
consequences, participatory processes in legal reform are probably
advisable.
Of course, there is a question as to the level of generality
referred to here. One can imagine that the more technical the
questions involved, the less likely that broadly participatory
processes should be employed. Questions of broader significance,
particularly those with distributive consequences, merit involvement

112.
For instance, this occurred in connection with Chicago Public School
reform, which included the participation of persons in local school councils who were
given training on technical matters such as budgeting.
Berkowitz et al., supra note 13, at 2 ("Our basic argument is that for law to
113.
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of a wider number of citizens.
As the earlier remarks about
orthodoxy suggest, no categorical commitment to particular processes
can be made. Instead, the processes must be aimed at solving the
particular societal problems to which legal-reform efforts are directed.
It is important to recognize the countervailing forces at work.
Participatory approaches undermine the ability of one interest
group-whether lawyers, economists, or politicians-to determine
outcomes.
Setting programmatic priorities through participatory
development processes thus requires lawyers to relinquish a degree of
control. They become one of a number of interested actors.
The
extent to which legal professionals are willing to accept more
inclusive approaches will bear on the legitimacy and durability of
changes that occur.
In an essay written at the height of postmodern debates on the
role of reason, Habermas called for philosophy to change its
orientation and self-conception.1 16 Recalling Kant's universalistic
philosophy that sought to find an a priori ground for human
experience as well as science, Habermas suggested that Kant had
been slightly arrogant. 117 Who were philosophers to determine for
the sciences what the conditions for their validity were? Likening the
rationalist philosopher to an usher assigning other disciplines to their
assigned seats, he claimed philosophy had taken on too great of a role
for itself." 8 Rather than the arbiter of all other human sciences,
Habermas suggested that philosophy should become "a stand-in and
interpreter" for these other disciplines. Philosophy was to be a
guardian of rationality, aiding the other human sciences by clarifying
and interpreting issues.11 9
The situation that law and development confronts is similar to
the situation Habermas addressed. Technical assistance in the legal
sector has been overstretched by taking responsibility for too many
matters that have far reaching consequences for the societies
concerned. It has come to play a starring role when it should be only
a supporting actor. Of course, a strong legal system is, ceteris
paribus, probably a good thing. Yet we must look at the legal system
not as the forum in which distributive questions can be settled, but
instead as the source of guidance to inform democratic processes
generating political and economic decisions. Like the conception of
philosophy Habermas proposed, law can play a supporting role in
connection with society's search for appropriate reform options.
In addition to de-privileging lawyers, the discursive model of
legal development will require elites to divest themselves of a certain
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amount of power. This should be a positive development because it
will cut down incentives for rent-seeking and clientism that become
particularly acute when the value of directing benefits to particular
parties is great. As the ability to deliver benefits of legal reform to
one party or group declines, so too will the value of state capture.
Evidence of the extent to which neo-liberal reforms may have been
used to further the elite's plunder of the state during the 1980s and
1990s cautions against placing responsibility for legal and judicial
reform in the hands of entrenched public-sector actors. 120 While it is
not self-evident that politically dominant parties will relinquish some
of their power to steer reforms, donors can offer incentives that may
appear preferable notwithstanding foregone opportunities for private
gain.

IV.

ILLUSTRATIONS AND APPLICATIONS

Examples from a number of contexts provide some indication of
the potential for participatory approaches in legal-reform work.
While each requires additional study to determine the extent to
which it lives up to the democratic imperative this Article posits, the
three examples described illustrate options for realizing the
democratic potential of law and development. The first example
involves the World Bank Institute's development of participatory
needs assessments for law and governance reform. This model relies
on grassroots involvement of citizens, civil society, and government in
assessing conditions in a society and developing strategic plans to
address problem areas. The second example, drawn from the massive
participatory governance program of the state of Kerala, India,
illustrates options for democratic decision-making on law and policy
reform. A final example involves the use of civil society actors in
providing legal services to disadvantaged groups in Ecuador.
Together, these cases illustrate the potential for broad participation
in diagnosing, designing, and implementing legal-reform activities.
A. World Bank Institute ParticipatoryGovernance Diagnostics
The World Bank Institute (WBI) has developed an approach to
technical assistance for national anti-corruption programs that

120.
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entails a high degree of citizen involvement. 121 While
experimenting with this approach, its basic contours
GAC (Governance and Capacity) Diagnostic Cycle is
response to the need to build capacity in a country
governance and policy design. The initiative aims to:

the WBI is still
are clear. The
the latest WBI
in the area of

(i) foster local capacity building through the close collaboration between
external experts and local counterparts;
(ii) promote
stakeholders;

long-term,

sustainable

partnerships

among

local

(iii) obtain an initial benchmark of governance and public sector
performance; and
(iv) monitor on a regular basis governance and public sector
performance. 122

Before the WBI will provide technical assistance for anti-corruption
programs, the state must formally request its assistance. Once
engaged, the first step involves the creation of a national steering
committee to oversee the development of a national anti-corruption
strategy. 123 This steering committee is made up of equal shares of
government and civil society representatives, such as the media,
NGOs, and churches. 124 According to this methodology, the key
partnership is between government and civil society.
The committee then initiates a participatory governance
assessment on corruption and governance in the country to inform
the development of national anti-corruption strategies. 125 It allows
citizens to both provide raw data used in gaining quantitative and
qualitative perspectives and participate in the analysis of that
data. 126 Questions are devised through a process involving citizens
and local survey firms, which also rely on assistance from national
statistical agencies.
Surveys of citizens, businesses, and public
officials are then conducted based on the methodology and questions
agreed upon.
Once the survey data are compiled and refined, a final diagnostic
127
report is circulated to those participating in national workshops.
Broad national workshops involving all branches of the public sector,
political parties, civil society, and professional groups are
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subsequently held. 128 At the national workshops, different working
groups are established to analyze survey results and develop a
consensual anti-corruption strategy. 129 Out of this process, the
government and civil society develop anti-corruption strategy and
action plans. 130 The action plans involve further workshops designed
to foster a free press, an environment conducive to private sector
investment, and transparency and efficiency of the executive,
In Albania, which rates
judiciary, and legislative branches. 13 1
extremely low in terms of corruption indices, the WBI contends that
its workshops are providing reason for "cautious hope. '' 132 Recently,
Albanian authorities have expressed the need to deal with the
problem of corruption and have formed relevant task forces with nongovernmental entities. According to WBI, Albanian firms claim that
corruption has fallen slightly over the past couple of years in the
areas of enterprise regulation, registration of ownership of physical or
real property, state banking services, and fire and sanitary
33
inspection.'
This developing WBI methodology seeks to develop rigorous
needs assessments through participatory processes. Implicitly, it
recognizes the limited ability of international experts to conduct
quantitative assessments without receiving input from local actors.
Before applying quantitative results to address local conditions, the
results undergo analysis through a discursive process among a wide
The centrality of local participation in
range of participants.
conducting assessments and defining strategies and action plans in
this model deviates from technocratic development assistance
strategies. Using this methodology, rather than imposing predefined
(orthodox) solutions, the donor acts as the catalyst for democratic
participation in legal and governance reform by creating ad hoc
institutional structures for addressing societal needs.
B. Kerala Economic Development Project
Among the states of the Indian subcontinent, and as a result of a
fifty-year democratic transformation, the state of Kerala has achieved
remarkably high social indicators of development, including infant
mortality rate, population growth, literacy, and life expectancy. A
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beacon of hope in a poverty-stricken country, Kerala could provide
lessons in development to other developing states.
After a new government came into office in the Indian state of
Kerala in 1996, the ruling party launched a "People's Campaign for
Decentralized Planning.' 1 34 The program is noteworthy for its scale
and boldness.
It is marked by three main decentralization
movements. First, administration was decentralized. 1 35 Second,
fiscal powers were decentralized through the allocation of
approximately forty percent of all development expenditures to local
self-governing institutions. 136
Third, political
power was
decentralized by providing elected local representatives more
authority over development projects and priorities. 137
The
government implemented these programs in an effort to remedy
failures of the previous political and bureaucratic institutions to
138
produce economic development.
The program involves a multi-tiered, grassroots deliberative
process. New local institutions have arisen to cultivate, gather, and
mediate the concerns of "elected representatives, local and higherlevel government officials, civil society experts and activists, and
ordinary citizens.' 139 The structure and its functions are truly novel.
The process begins in open local assemblies, called grama sabhas, in
which participants discuss and identify development priorities.
Development seminars formed by the grama sabhas are then tasked
with developing more elaborate assessments of local problems and
needs. The development seminars give way to multi-stakeholder task
forces that design specific projects for various development sectors.
These projects are in turn submitted to local elected bodies (municipal
councils called panchayats) that formulate and set budgets for local
plans. Final plans are presented back to grama sabhas for discussion.
These local plans are then integrated into higher-level plans (blocks
and districts) during which all projects are vetted for technical and
140
fiscal visibility.

The core elements of this program-collection of local
information and formulation of a local plan-are common to the other
programs discussed in this Article. It is important to understand that
this program does not merely devolve power to un-elected local
authorities, leaving them to their own devices.
Instead, local
gathering and analysis of information and strategy development
undergoes review by successive governance layers.
The system
applies technical expertise in the formation of policy at all levels.
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One important contributor to the functioning of this system is the
41
existence of a vital civil society, particularly NGOs.I
The People's Plan Campaign (PPC) was a radical program of
democratic decentralization to increase public participation in
development decision-making, established by the state's Left
Democratic Front coalition in the mid 1990s. 1 4 2 This new system of
political representation and development planning encouraged a
massive growth spurt on the part of civil society. In Jenkins' opinion
such entities as "user committees," "women's groups," and
"neighborhood groups"-voluntary associations that under the
People's Plan had to be formed in order to obtain certain state
14 3
benefits-qualify as bona fide representatives of civil society.
Nevertheless, Isaac and Heller rightly caution that causation
may run in the other direction as well because the degree to which
associational life develops is partly a consequence of the institutional
environment. 144 Put conversely, top-down governance represents a
self-fulfilling prophecy: citizens are deemed incapable because their
1 45
ability to engage in self-government remains uncultivated.
Given the scale of citizen involvement that has occurred in
Kerala, citizen involvement has effectively become an important
check on the power of elites. To the extent that citizens are working
alongside elected officials in designing and executing programs,
traditional principal/agent relationships are transformed. 146 Citizens
are no longer resigned to the relatively weak accountability voting
affords, but instead can express their voices in a more direct manner.
The net effect of this system of open deliberative governance is to
further entrench democracy through enhanced legitimacy and
efficacy. Profound changes are further enhancing civil society: the
proliferation of national and international media, including the
internet, brings 'national organizing' within the grasp of an ever14 7
increasing number of associations.
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C. Legal Services for Poor Women in Ecuador
In Ecuador, the World Bank sponsored a major Judicial Reform
Program beginning in 1995.148
In addition to traditional case
management, alternative dispute resolution, and courthouse
modernization, the program involved extensive use of 'civil society in
connection with a law and justice program. 149 Under the law and
justice program, a special fund for law and justice overseen by
ProLegal was created to support a variety of activities, including
legal-services pilot programs for poor women. 150 The program for
legal services for poor women was particularly innovative in its use of
service providers to gain practical grassroots input on legal-reform
topics. 151
Before the program was implemented, women needing legal
services for matters such as child custody or domestic or sexual
violence could only seek services from one of four public defenders
serving Quito, a city of two million. 15 2 The program involved the
creation of legal service centers run by NGOs, which coordinate their
1 53
efforts with governmental and nongovernmental organizations.
The centers provide mediation services, educate women on the law,
and provide training and raise awareness on the prevention of
domestic violence. 15 4 In an unorthodox approach to legal services, the
centers offer both traditional legal services as well as counseling on
Given the
psychological issues arising from domestic violence.
apparently discriminatory attitudes toward women among many
Ecuadoran legal and judicial professionals, 1 55 the centers have earned
the trust of their clients and arguably provide better representation
156
of women's interests than is obtainable elsewhere.
The NGOs were required in their agreement with ProLegal to
conduct a minimum number of consultations each month. One NGO
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of
in particular, the Ecuadorian Center for the Promotion and Action 157
cases.
resolving
in
successful
quite
was
the Woman (CEPAM),
of
This result was noteworthy because it is contrary to the experience 158
substantial delays that most Ecuadorian litigants experience.
Observations of clients also suggest a possible positive unintended
consequence of the program.15 9 By injecting organizations capable of
providing effective representations of clients into the system,
competition between legal professionals could raise the overall
standard of representation.
In addition to the legal services provided, CEPAM prepared a
study reviewing experience with the law regulating common law
160
marriages and obstacles to compliance with the law's intent.
Based in part on knowledge gained through service delivery with the
affected population, the report examined the understanding and
161
actual reliance on the law by women in common law marriages.
The report was distributed in three cities in which workshops were
held so that the findings of the report could be discussed. 162 A final
national workshop, convened in partnership with a regional Supreme
163
Court Justice, involved further discussion of the report's findings.
The workshops brought together ministers, judges, and lawyers from
universities and free legal clinics, personnel from the Commissariat
of Women, bar associations, juvenile courts, public defenders, and
The
representatives from grassroots women's organizations. 1 64
that were
recommendations
reform
generated
workshops
communicated directly to the Congress's Commission on Women,
Children, Youth and Family for consideration in drafting a Family
Code. CEPAM members actively participated in the Commission's
165
meetings on this code.
In addition to this law reform activity, CEPAM used its provision
of legal services to generate substantial information regarding the
population it served. 166 A database compiling the information was
created and is used to draw comparisons with other NGO service
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providers. 16 7 The information generated is being used to analyze and
compare the experience of different local offices. This information
will then be published and shared with other NGOs, including other
1 68
service providers and women's groups.
This legal services program was noteworthy for its cultivation of
civil society organizations as service delivery agencies. The use of
NGOs in this manner ensured that the legal services programs were
designed and delivered in a manner responsive to the needs of the
women served. In addition, the local orientation of these NGOs made
them better able to obtain accurate feedback from clients to improve
the program and gain comparative perspectives. Because of the
specific focus of the organizations on women's concerns, they were
better placed to conduct the analysis and facilitate deliberation on the
legal reform of common law marriage. The broad participatory
process of deliberation on the report, and the tangible knowledge
obtained, likely helped CEPAM gain sufficient stature to enable it to
participate in the legislative process. Although sponsored by the
World Bank, the legal reforms engendered by these NGOs appear to
be organic.

V. CONCLUSION

Law and development stands at a crossroads. At this time it
may be useful to recall experience in connection with the creation of
new democracies in the decolonization process of the early twentieth
century. Writing of the move to establish democracy in former
colonies, J.S. Furnivall suggested that there was a need to first create
something he called a "democratic environment. '' 16 9 In contrast to
those who suggested that a culturally specific model of democracy as
realized in the West be applied to the new democracies in the East, he
argued that the challenge was to create an environment suited to a
particular country. 170
Each society would then work to create its
Contrary to prevailing
own unique democratic "machinery.' 171
opinion, Furnivall maintained that the colonial powers could not
impose democracy on the countries becoming independent, but rather
would have to "establish conditions favorable to the conduct of
experiments," whereby each country could work out its own solution
172
by trial and error.
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This Article contends that it is precisely the process of national
trial and error that is an essential contributor to the realization of a
legitimate democratic and legal order. Consistent with these views,
the direct deliberative democratic model of legal reform holds
significant possibilities for revitalizing the movement and ensuring
Problems of knowledge, politics,
that underlying goals are met.
social practice, -and incentives challenge the effectiveness of
hierarchical and centralized approaches to law and development. To
the extent that law-making priorities are set through negotiation and
bargaining between states and donors, state institutions and
democratic impulses fail to grow organically. It is an example of the
democracy deficit much discussed in globalization debates. The
deliberative democratic legal-reform model avoids stretching the
cognitive limits of such a top-down approach and imposing an
artificial separation between development of democracy and the rule
of law. The deliberative process simultaneously cultivates democracy
and the rule of law not through great leaps in tension with
democratic values, but through actual democratic practice.
As Habermas shows, great changes in existing legal norms
without first proceeding through discursive processes hold the allure
Without
of improved formal legal structures at great cost.
deliberative democratic input, legal rights cannot be properly
formulated or implemented. The technocratic impulse in rule-of-law
promotion correlates to the democracy deficit that occurs on the state
level through the dominance of experts and the insulation of domestic
governance from popular influence. 173 If the promotion of the rule of
law and democracy is to be taken seriously, then democracy must be
taken not only as a starting point, but also as an end goal as well.
The directly deliberative account also provides an answer to the
incentive problem discussed at the outset of this Article. Through
directly deliberative practices, citizens participate in identifying
problems and the definition of both means and ends. 174 Participatory
governance assessments help galvanize public opinion around a set of
problems citizens recognize as important. Likewise, development of
action plans through grassroots dialogue ensures coherence of policy
ends and means. Providing services and formulating law reform
priorities based on the expressed needs and experience of populations
concerned ties macro policy-making to micro experience organically.
Out of participation, incentives emerge. Political forces naturally
converge around legal-reform options that have been collectively
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determined. Organic development of legal-reform programs thus
produces its own incentives.
On this model, the role of donors is still important. Rather than
defining solutions for society, they use their resources, technical
expertise, comparative knowledge, and moral authority to create
space in which democratic self-discovery can occur. As John Stuart
Mill argued in defense of the freedom of expression, the truth is
discernable only through free and open discourse. 175 The deliberative
model of law and development may create the space necessary to open
our minds to new reform options. If successful, this strategy may not
only ensure that law and development achieves its purpose, but may
also solidify democratic governance through more just, and therefore
more legitimate, states.
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